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COMMENTARY
Earl Warren as a Judge
By BERNARD SCHWARTZ*
Introduction
It is now fifteen years since Earl Warren retired as Chief Justice of
the United States and ten years since his death.1 Enough time has passed
to confirm the common estimate that the Warren Court era constitutes
one of the most significant in American judicial history, second only to
the Marshall Court. During Warren's tenure, the Supreme Court virtu-
ally rewrote the corpus of our constitutional law. Concepts and princi-
ples that had appeared unduly radical not too long ago became accepted
rules of law. In this sense, the Warren period was a second formative era
in Supreme Court history, in which public law underwent changes as
profound as the ones occurring in the country at large. The Warren
Court led the movement to remake constitutional law in the image of an
evolving society. In doing so, the Justices had to perform the originative
role that the jurist normally is not called upon to exercise in more stable
times-a role usually considered more appropriate for the legislator than
for the judge.
The constitutional revolution wrought by the Warren Court is now
widely recognized, but there is no consensus concerning the role of Earl
Warren in bringing it about. More particularly, was the Chief Justice in
fact responsible for the decisions handed down by the Warren Court or
was he only its titular head?
Too many constitutional scholars assume that the latter answer is
the correct one. They claim that while Warren may have been the nomi-
nal head of the Court that bears his name, other Justices furnished the
actual leadership. For example, Dunne's biography of Hugo Black pro-
poses that Justice Black was really responsible for the "judicial revolu-
tion" that occurred during the Warren years.' More recently, a review of
* Edwin D. Webb Professor of Law, New York University School of Law.
1. Chief Justice Warren retired on June 23, 1969 and died on July 9, 1974.
2. G. DUNNE, HUGO BLACK AND THE JUDICIAL REVOLUTION chs. 14-19 (1977).
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my own biography of Chief Justice Warren asserts that "the Brennan
Court" provided a more appropriate title of the High Bench while War-
ren sat in its center chair.
Justice Black himself always believed that he had led the judicial
revolution during Warren's tenure. Black resented the acclaim that the
Chief Justice received for leading the Court. As Black saw it, the Warren
Court had only written into law the constitutional principles that he had
advocated for many years.4 When Warren retired as Chief Justice, the
Justices prepared the traditional letter of farewell. The draft letter read:
"For us it is a source of pride that we have had the opportunity to be
members of the Warren Court." Black changed the last phrase to "the
Court over which you have presided."5
My biography of Warren portrays him as a strong Chief Justice
whose leadership of the Court is best characterized by the book's title,
Super Chief-the title used by Justice Brennan after the Chief Justice's
retirement and adopted by members of the Court who looked back with
nostalgia at the Warren years.6 The laudatory sobriquet does not, how-
ever, answer the question of Warren's effectiveness as a judge. Nor was
that question answered in Super Chief, which presented a factual account
of the work of the Warren Court. By emphasizing the Court's delibera-
tions during important cases, the biography intended to reveal what hap-
pened behind the red velour curtain. Critical analysis of Warren's
judicial performance was intentionally not included.
I. Leadership Not Scholarship
This Commentary, on the other hand, attempts to analyze Earl
Warren as a judge. The analysis begins by paraphrasing Macaulay's fa-
mous statement: "There were gentlemen and there were seamen in the
navy of Charles II. But the seamen were not gentlemen, and the gentle-
men were not seamen."7 There have been scholars and there have been
3. Hutchinson, Hail to the Chief- Earl Warren and the Supreme Court, 81 MICH. L.
REV. 922, 923 (1983).
4. During the 1963 Term, the Court overturned a number of precedents that had become
law over Justice Black's dissent. A. BICKEL, POLITICS AND THE WARREN COURT 168 (1965).
See, eg., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Gideon
v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
5. "Dear Chief" Draft with changes in Black's handwriting (June 23, 1969) (Hugo L.
Black Papers, Library of Congress).
6. See B. SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF: EARL WARREN AND His SUPREME COURT-A
JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY 771 (1983).
7. 1 T. MACAULAY, HISTORY OF ENGLAND 279.
great Justices on the Supreme Court. But the scholars have not always
been great Justices, and the great Justices have not always been scholars.
To be sure, outstanding scholars did sit on the Warren Court;
among them, Felix Frankfurter stands out. Frankfurter was as learned a
Justice as ever sat on the Supreme Court. His scholarship far exceeded
the bounds of legal arcana, unlike so many juristic scholars. The range
of the Justice's scholarly interests is illustrated not only in his opinions
and published writings, but also in his amazingly varied correspondence
with the leading intellectual figures of the day-ranging from Alfred
North Whitehead to John Dewey to Albert Einstein.8 Publication of
Frankfurter's best letters would serve not only law, but scholarship and
literature as well.
Yet, Frankfurter may have been a better letter writer than he was a
judge. With all his intellect and scholarly talents, Frankfurter's judicial
career remained essentially a lost opportunity. As far as public law was
concerned, he may well have had more influence as a law professor than
as a Supreme Court Justice.9 Although Frankfurter may have expected
to be the intellectual leader of the Court, as he had been of the Harvard
law faculty, the Chief Justice himself performed the true leadership role
in the Warren Court.
But Warren was never a legal scholar in the Frankfurter sense. "I
wish that I could speak to you in the words of a scholar," the Chief
Justice once told an audience, "but it has not fallen to my lot to be a
scholar in life."' 0 The Justices who sat with him have all stressed that
Warren may not have been an intellectual like Frankfurter, "l but then, as
Justice Stewart observed, "he never pretended to be one."12
In assessing the importance of scholarship as a judicial attribute, one
should distinguish sharply between a member of the Supreme Court and
its Chief Justice. Without a doubt, Justice Story was the greatest legal
scholar ever to sit on the Court. His scholarship enabled him to make his
outstanding judicial record, and his legal expertise supplied the one thing
that Chief Justice Marshall lacked. Indeed, Marshall is reputed to have
once said: "Brother Story here ... can give us the cases from the
Twelve Tables down to the latest reports."' 3 It is safe to assume that
8. See generally Felix Frankfurter Papers (available in the Library of Congress).
9. Cf. J. LASH, FROM THE DIARIES OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 87 (1975).
10. J. POLLACK, EARL WARREN: THE JUDGE WHO CHANGED AMERICA 193 (1979).
11. Conversations with several Justices (Sept. 1979 and unrecorded dates).
12. Interview with Justice Stewart (Sept. 1979).
13. G. DUNNE, JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY AND THE RISE OF THE SUPREME COURT 91
(1970).
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Story's learning often fleshed out the Chief Justice's reasoning with the
scholarly foundation needed to support some Marshall opinions.
Still, no one conversant with American law will conclude that Story
was a greater judge than Marshall. Story's scholarship could scarcely
have produced the constitutional landmarks of the Marshall Court.
When Marshall died, Story's admirers hoped that he would become the
new Chief Justice.14 But Story's appointment could have been a disaster;
the scholar on the bench would have been a misfit in the Court's center
chair.
This hypothesis is not mere conjecture. It is supported by the
Court's experience under Chief Justice Stone, who, like Frankfurter, had
been a noted law professor. From an intellectual viewpoint, Stone was
an outstanding judge. Yet he failed as Chief Justice; his lack of adminis-
trative ability nearly destroyed the Court's effectiveness. The Stone
Court presented a spectacle of unedifying atomization wholly at variance
with its functioning as a collegiate tribunal.15
Stone's ineffectiveness was shown in his conduct at the conferences,
a crucial stage in the Court's decisionmaking process. As Justice Stewart
remarked, "Stone's problem was that, at a conference, he himself always
insisted upon having the last word, and that's not the way you preside-
always arguing with the person that had spoken." The result, as Stewart
characterized it, was, not a discussion, but "a free-for-all." 16
Warren clearly did not equal Stone as a legal scholar. But his lead-
ership abilities and skill as a statesman enabled him to be the most effec-
tive Chief Justice since Charles Evans Hughes. Those Justices who
served with him stressed Warren's leadership abilities, particularly his
skill in conducting the conference. "It was incredible," said Justice
Brennan just after Warren's death, "how efficiently the Chief would con-
duct the Friday conferences, leading the discussion of every case on the
agenda, with a knowledge of each case at his fingertips." '1 7
A legal scholar such as Stone treated the conference as a law school
seminar, "carrying on a running debate with any justice who expresse[d]
views different from his."'" At conference, Warren rarely contradicted
the others and made sure that each of them had his full say. Above all,
he stated the issues in a deceptively simple way, reaching the heart of the
14. "The Supreme Court," Harvard President Josiah Quincy toasted, "may it be raised
one Story higher." Id. at 307-08.
15. J. LASH, supra note 9, at 152.
16. Interview with Justice Stewart, supra note 12.
17. N.Y. Times, July 10, 1974, at 24.
18. J. LASH, supra note 9, at 152 (quoting Justice Frankfurter).
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matter while stripping it of legal technicalities. As the Washington Post
noted, "Warren helped steer cases from the moment they were first dis-
cussed simply by the way he framed the issues." 19
In his first conference on Brown v. Board of Education,20 Warren
presented the question before the Court in terms of racial inferiority. He
told the Justices that segregation could be justified only by belief in the
inherent inferiority of blacks and, if Plessy v. Ferguson2 1 was followed, it
had to be upon that basis.22 A scholar such as Frankfurter certainly
would not have presented the case that way. But Warren's "simplistic"
words went straight to the ultimate human values involved. In the face
of such an approach, arguments based on legal scholarship would have
seemed inappropriate, almost pettifoggery.
The work of a Chief Justice differs greatly from that of other mem-
bers of the Court as far as legal scholarship is concerned. A person with-
out scholarly interests would find the work of an Associate Justice most
unrewarding, since an Associate Justice spends his Court time only hear-
ing and voting on cases and writing opinions. Thus, while considering
the appointment of a successor to Chief Justice Vinson, President Eisen-
hower asked a member of Governor Warren's staff whether Warren
would really want to be on the Court after his years in high political
office: "Wouldn't it be pretty rarified for him?" "Yes," came back the
answer, "I frankly think he'd be very likely to be bored to death [as an
Associate Justice]." But, the response went on: "My answer would be
emphatically different if we were talking about the Chief Justiceship. He
could run the place."23
The staff member's answer gets to the heart of the subject under
discussion. The essential attribute of a Chief Justice is not scholarship
but leadership. If he can "run the place" and induce the Justices to fol-
low his lead, he will effectively head the Court.
The Chief Justice must still write his share of opinions backed by the
traditional indicia of legal scholarship: discussion of complicated techni-
cal issues, citation and consideration of precedents, and learned-looking
footnotes. But a lack of scholarly attainments does not necessarily pre-
clude the production of learned opinions. The necessary scholarship can
be supplied by the bright, young, ex-law review editors who serve as the
19. Wash. Post, June 15, 1983, at A16, col. 5.
20. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
21. 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (establishing the doctrine of "separate but equal," which was
overruled sub silencio in Brown).
22. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, at 86-87.
23. Id. at 4.
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Justices' law clerks. It did not take The Brethren24 to make students of
the Court aware of how much of the opinion-writing process has been
delegated to the clerks. "As the years passed," wrote Justice Douglas of
his own Court years, "it became more and more evident that the law
clerks were drafting opinions."25 The first drafts of the opinions that
Chief Justice Warren assigned to himself were all prepared by his law
clerks.
The Chief Justice would outline the way he wanted the opinion
drafted, leaving the clerk with a great deal of discretion to flesh out the
details of the opinion. Warren never pretended to be a scholar interested
in research and legal minutiae. He left the reasoning and research sup-
porting the decision to his clerks, as well as the task of compiling exten-
sive footnotes, an indispensible component of the well-crafted judicial
opinion." Perhaps the most famous footnote in any Supreme Court
opinion appeared in Brown v. Board of Education.27 Noted footnote
eleven listed seven works by social scientists to support the statement
that segregation meant black inferiority.28 Yet one of Warren's law
clerks inserted the footnote into the opinion, and neither the Chief Jus-
tice nor the Associate Justices paid much attention to it at the time.29
II. Practical Experience and Decision Ability
Even if Chief Justice Warren was an effective leader, can it be said
that he was a competent judge? One can go further and ask the question
that was once asked about Justice Black: "Granting that [his] influence
has been great, has he played the part of a judge?"30
In important respects, Warren as a judge differed from most occu-
pants of the bench. Even his admirers admit that Warren was no Car-
dozo-type acolyte of the common law. This recognition appears as a
natural corollary to the fact that he never devoted his life to the intrica-
cies of juridical science. At the same time, it is erroneous to assume that
because of his high political position at the time of his judicial appoint-
ment, Warren lacked experience in practicing law. His critics constantly
charged that the Chief Justice had very little legal experience. Those
24. B. WOODWARD & S. ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT
9-10 (1979).
25. W.O. DOUGLAS, THE COURT YEARS 1939-1975, at 173 (1980).
26. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, at 68.
27. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
28. Id. at 494 n.11.
29. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, at 107-08.
30. Reich, The Living Constitution and the Court's Role, in HUGO BLACK AND THE
SUPREME COURT 159 (S. Strickland ed. 1967).
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dissatisfied with the decisions of the Warren Court used to say that they
could expect nothing else from a tribunal not headed by a real lawyer.31
But the charge was misplaced; Warren had more experience in legal
practice than any other member of the Court to which he was appointed.
He had headed one of the biggest law offices in California for thirteen
years and served as the state's highest legal officer for another four years
before becoming Governor.
Moreover, an examination of Warren's files as district attorney in
the California State Archives reveals his skill as a lawyer, particularly in
trial work. Warren personally appeared in court in many cases. In fact,
he probably had more trial experience than most Supreme Court Jus-
tices. Willard W. Shea, the public defender of Alameda County when
Warren served as county district attorney, referred to the record in War-
ren's most controversial trial and said, "if you flip pages rapidly and pick
out the ones where Warren himself is doing either the examining or the
cross-examining, it will give you considerable insight into his marvellous
ability as a trial lawyer."32
Even more significant than practical legal experience is a judge's
ability to reach a decision. The importance of this trait is illustrated by
the career of the member of the Warren Court who most lacked it: Jus-
tice Whittaker. More than any other Justice, Whittaker found it difficult
to make up his mind. Warren's "great strength," a Justice of the Warren
Court told me, was "not to have to agonize. That was Charlie Whitta-
ker's great problem, you know. He was a very, very conscientious man
and a fine man, but he just didn't have the power of decision."33 Accord-
ing to Justice Douglas, "In Conference, Whittaker would take one posi-
tion when the Chief or Black spoke, change his mind when Frankfurter
spoke, and change back again when some other Justice spoke."' 34 After
the conference, Whittaker would often agonize and agonize over deci-
31. See, eg., the statement by Senator McCarthy: "We made a mistake in confirming as
Chief Justice a man who had no judicial experience and very little legal experience." N.Y.
Times, May 12, 1956, at 6.
32. W.W. Shea, Recollections of Alameda County's First Public Defender, in PERSPEC-
TIVES ON THE ALAMEDA COUNTY DISTRICT ATrORNEY'S OFFICE (1972) (Earl Warren Oral
History Project, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley). See G. WHITE, EARL
WARREN: A PUBLIC LIFE 34 (1982).
The trial record referred to is that of the celebrated S.S. Point Lobos murder case. The
defendants, three of whom were maritime union members, were convicted of second degree
murder for the slaying of the Point Lobos' chief engineer. People v. King, 30 Cal. App. 2d 185,
85 P.2d 928 (1938). The case was Warren's most controversial because the trial occurred
during a crippling nationwide port strike. See generally J. WEAVER, WARREN: THE MAN,
THE COURT, THE ERA 84-94 (1967).
33. Interview with Supreme Court Justice (Sept. 1979) (name withheld by request).
34. W.O. DOUGLAS, supra note 25, at 173.
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sions, swinging back and forth in key cases, which would make it most
difficult for the Chief Justice and the others.
Chief Justice Warren, in contrast, had been making important deci-
sions throughout his career and, by the time he arrived at the Court,
decisionmaking was second-nature to him. He had an open mind and
was amenable to persuasion, but he never struggled over decisions.
Nor did Warren ever delegate his decision power. His clerks might
prepare drafts of opinions, but the Chief Justice constantly stressed to
them that they were not "unguided missiles."35 Once Warren made up
his mind on a decision, he would stubbornly hold to it. As Justice Byron
White recalled, Warren "was quite willing to listen to people at length
• ..but, when he made up his mind, it was like the sun went down, and
he was very firm, very firm about it." 6 The law clerks never had any
doubt about who was the judge in the Warren chambers.
III. Fairness and Activism
There is an antinomy inherent in every system of law: the law must
be stable and yet it cannot stand still.3 7 It is the task of the judge to
reconcile these two conflicting elements. In doing so, jurists tend to
stress one principle or the other. Stability and change may be the twin
sisters of the law, but few judges can keep an equipoise between the two.
Chief Justice Warren never pretended to try to maintain the bal-
ance. As soon as he had become established on the Court, he came down
firmly on the side of change, leading the Supreme Court's effort to enable
public law to cope with rapid societal change. Warren strongly believed
that the law must draw its vitality from life rather than precedent.
What Holmes termed "intuitions" of what best served the public inter-
est 38 played the major part in Warren's jurisprudence. He did not sacri-
fice good sense for the syllogism. Nor was he one of "those who think
more of symmetry and logic in the development of legal rules than of
practical adaptation to the attainment of a just result., 39 When symme-
try and logic were balanced against considerations of equity and fairness,
he normally found the latter to be weightier." In the Warren hierarchy
of social values, the moral outweighed the material.41
35. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, at 68.
36. Interview with Justice White (Sept. 1979).
37. R. POUND, INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL HISTORY 1 (1923).
38. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1923).
39. Id. at 1, 35-36.
40. Cf. Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 230 N.Y. 239, 242-43 (1921) (Cardozo, J.).
41. Cf B. CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL SCIENCE 57 (1927).
Throughout his tenure on the Court, the Chief Justice tended to use
"fairness" as the polestar of his judicial approach. Every so often in
criminal cases, when counsel defending a conviction would cite legal
precedents, Warren would bend his bulk over the bench to ask, "Yes,
yes-but were you fair?"'42 The fairness to which the Chief Justice re-
ferred was no jurisprudential abstraction. It related to such things as
methods of arrest, questioning of suspects, and police conduct-matters
that Warren understood well from his earlier years as district attorney in
Alameda County, California. Decisions like Miranda v. Arizona43 were
based directly upon the Warren fairness approach.
The Chief Justice's emphasis upon fairness and just results led him
to join hands with Justices Black and Douglas and their activist ap-
proach to constitutional law. Their activism led to Warren's break with
Justice Frankfurter-the foremost advocate on the Court of the Holmes
doctrine of judicial restraint. To Justice Holmes, the legislator was to
have the primary say on the considerations behind laws; the judge's duty
was to enforce "even laws that I believe to embody economic mis-
takes."'  Frankfurter remained true to the Holmes approach, insisting
that self-restraint was the proper posture of a nonrepresentative judici-
ary, regardless of the nature of the asserted interests in particular cases.
Warren followed the canon of judicial restraint in the economic area, but
he felt that the Bill of Rights provisions protecting personal liberties im-
posed more active enforcement obligations on judges. When a law alleg-
edly infringed upon personal rights guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, the
Chief Justice refused to defer to the legislative judgment that had consid-
ered the law necessary.
Warren rejected the Frankfurter philosophy of judicial restraint be-
cause he believed that it thwarted effective performance of the Court's
constitutional role. Judicial restraint, in the Chief Justice's view, all too
often meant judicial abdication of the duty to enforce constitutional
guarantees. "I believe," Warren declared in an interview on his retire-
ment, "that this Court or any court should exercise the functions of the
office to the limit of its responsibilities."45 Judicial restraint meant that,
"for a long, long time we have been sweeping under the rug a great many
problems basic to American life. We have failed to face up to them, and
42. A. LEwis, PORTRAIT OF A DECADE: THE SECOND AMERICAN REVOLUTION 139
(1964).
43. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
44. 1 HOLMES-POLLOCK LETTERS: THE CORRESPONDENCE OF MR. JUSTICE HOLMES
AND SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK 1874-1932, at 167 (M. De Wolfe ed. 1961).
45. Earl Warren Talks About the Warren Court, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., July 15,
1968, at 62, 64.
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they have piled up on us, and now they are causing a great deal of dissen-
sion and controversy of all kinds."46 To Warren, it was the Court's job
"to remedy those things eventually," regardless of the controversy in-
volved.47 The Warren approach in this respect left little room for defer-
ence to the legislature, the core of the restraint canon.
The crucial question in constitutional cases, according to Justice
Frankfurter, was
who is to judge? Is it the Court or Congress? Indeed, more accu-
rately, must not the Court put on the sackcloth and ashes of defer-
ring humility in order to determine whether the judgment that
Congress exercise[s] . . . is so outside the limits of a supportable
judgment by those who have the primary duty of judgment as to
constitute that disregard of reason which we call an arbitrary judg-
ment [?]48
To Warren and his supporters, Frankfurter had posed the wrong
questions. Their view was well-expressed by Justice Black when he re-
plied to a letter asking whether the Court should defer to congressional
judgment on constitutional issues. Black wrote:
The question just does not make sense to me. This is because if the
Court must "defer" to the legislative judgment about whether a
statute is constitutional, then the Court must yield its responsibil-
ity to another body that does not possess that responsibility. If, as
I think, the judiciary is vested with the Supreme, constitutional
power and responsibility to pass on the validity of legislation, then
I think it cannot "defer" to the legislative judgment "without abdi-
cating its own responsibility. .. .,49
To Black, constitutional decisions should not depend upon any deference
doctrine, but only "on the Court's honest judgment" on constitutional-
ity.5° "I think it is the business and the supreme responsibility of the
Court to hold a law unconstitutional if it believes that the law is uncon-
stitutional, without 'deference' to anybody or any institution. In short,
as to this phase of the discussion, I believe it is the duty of the Court to
show 'deference' to the Constitution only."51
The Chief Justice and his activist supporters on the Warren Court
fully shared Black's view on deference. Detailed analysis of conference
notes, memoranda, draft opinions, and extensive interviews reveal that
46. Ict
47. Id.
48. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to John M. Harlan (May 9, 1957) (The Felix Frank-
furter Papers, available at Harvard Law School).
49. Letter from Hugo L. Black to Fred Rodell (Sept. 5, 1962) (The Hugo L. Black Papers,
available in the Library of Congress).
50. Id.
51. Id.
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Warren never considered constitutional issues in the light of any desired
deference to the legislature. Instead, he decided those issues based on his
own independent judgment, normally giving little weight to the fact that
a reasonable legislator might have voted for the challenged law.
For Warren, the issue on judicial review was not reasonableness but
rightness. If the law was contrary to his own conception of what the
Constitution demanded, it did not matter that a reasonable legislator
might reach the opposite conclusion. When Warren decided that the
Constitution required an equal population apportionment standard for
all legislative chambers except the United States Senate,52 the fact that no
American legislature had followed the new requirement did not deter
him from uniformly applying the standard. Justice Harlan's dissent may
have demonstrated that the consistent state practice was, at the least,
reasonable.53 For the Chief Justice, however, legislative reasonableness
was irrelevant when the practice conflicted with his own interpretation of
the Constitution.
IV. Fountain of Justice
A much quoted statement by Anthony Lewis asserts that "Earl
Warren was the closest thing the United States has had to a Platonic
Guardian, dispensing law from a throne without any sensed limits of
power except what was seen as the good of society."54 But Warren was
more than the judicial counterpart of the Platonic philosopher-king. He
consciously conceived of the Supreme Court as a virtual modem Court of
Chancery, a residual "fountain of justice" to rectify individual instances
of injustice, particularly where the victims suffered from racial, eco-
nomic, or similar disabilities. He saw himself as a present-day Chancel-
lor, who secured fairness and equity in individual cases, particularly
where they involved his "constituency" of the poor or underprivileged.
"If the Chief Justice," Justice Stewart once commented, "can see
some issue that involves widows or orphans or the underprivileged, then
he's going to come down on that side."55
Until his retirement in 1962, Justice Frankfurter strongly disagreed
with the Warren conception of the Court. The disagreement emerged
when the Court agreed to reconsider the merits of cases involving em-
ployment injury under workers' compensation laws or the Federal Em-
52. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
53. Id. at 589, 602-15 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
54. 4 JusTIcEs OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 1789-1969, at 2726 (L. Fried-
man & F. Israel eds. 1969).
55. Interview with Justice Stewart, supra note 12.
Winter 1985] EARL WARREN AS A JUDGE
190 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 12:179
ployers Liability Act (FELA). Based on the facts, the Chief Justice's
very first opinion reversed a lower court injunction against enforcing a
workers' compensation award. The decision emphasized that "[tihis Act
must be liberally construed in conformance with its purpose ... ,56
During the Warren years, the Chief Justice led the Court in reversing a
large number of employment injury cases on their merits. In fact,
Supreme Court "decisions relating to the sufficiency of the evidence
under the FELA" increased four-fold during Warren's first three terms,
compared with the three terms before he became Chief Justice.57
Justice Frankfurter believed the Supreme Court should never have
taken these cases. "I do not think," he wrote to the Chief Justice, "the
correction of an erroneous decision, after two courts have dealt with the
matter. is the proper business of this Court."58 In the Frankfurter
view, the Supreme Court was not "a court for the correction of errors."59
In a number of these cases, Frankfurter dissented' and "read his col-
leagues a lecture on the need to conserve the Court's time and energy, by
avoiding trivial cases.",
61
The Chief Justice felt just as strongly that the job of the Supreme
Court was to ensure a just result in these cases. Warren looked upon the
Court as the last resort of the employees and their widows and orphans
who had lost under the FELA and in other employment injury cases.
The Chief Justice used to stress to his law clerks how important it was
that the Court take some FELA cases each year to make sure that the
lower courts understood that the statute was intended to protect the em-
ployee's right to recover.62
Yet Warren's conception of the Supreme Court as the residual
"fountain of justice" went far beyond instances where recovery had been
denied in employment injury cases. To the Chief Justice, the Court func-
tioned to ensure fairness and equity in all cases where they had not been
secured by other governmental processes. In Warren's view, the political
branches of government had defaulted in such cases. Where a constitu-
tional requirement remained unenforced due to governmental failure to
compel obedience to it, the Court had to act. The alternative as Warren
56. Voris v. Eikel, 346 U.S. 328, 333 (1953).
57. Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 352 U.S. 521, 548 app. A (1957) (Frankfurter,
J., dissenting).
58. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Earl Warren (Jan. 26, 1956) (The Felix Frankfurter
Papers, available in the Library of Congress).
59. Id.
60. The cases are cited in Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 352 U.S. at 526 n.3.
61. N.Y. Times, May 19, 1959, § 1, at 1, col. 3.
62. This statement is based on the author's interviews with many former Warren clerks.
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saw it was an empty Constitution, the essential provisions of which were
rendered nugatory because they could not be enforced.
For example, the Chief Justice explained the Warren Court deci-
sions requiring legislative reapportionment on the following basis: "Most
of these problems," he declared some years after those decisions, "could
have been solved through the political processes rather than through the
courts. But as it was, the Court had to decide."63
This Commentary contends that this same legislative inaction influ-
enced the most important cases decided by the Warren Court. The Chief
Justice and his colleagues felt that they had to step in because the polit-
ical branches had not acted to vindicate certain constitutional rights, and
the government could not or would not act in the future to correct the
situation. From this point of view, the Warren Court acted not so much
out of an activist desire to remake the law and society, but rather out of
the need to remedy the constitutional effects of governmental paralysis.
Analyzing the principal decisions of the Warren Court sustains this
thesis.
V. Political Default and Warren Court Decisions
A. Brown v. Board of Education
Any analysis of the Warren Court's principal decisions should begin
with Brown v. Board of Education, 4 in many ways the watershed consti-
tutional case of the century. When the Brown decision struck down
school segregation as violative of the Equal Protection Clause, it signaled
the beginning of effective civil rights enforcement in American law.
The Brown decision was a direct consequence of the political pro-
cess' failure to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of racial
equality. Before Brown, it had become a constitutional clich6 that the
amendment had not succeeded in securing equality for blacks; that fail-
ure largely resulted from governmental default. Government had not ac-
ted to eliminate the almost patent violation of equal protection; instead,
both state and federal laws perpetuated the segregation that existed in
much of the country, including the nation's capitol.
It was utterly unrealistic to expect state governmental action to end
segregation in those states where Jim Crow had become the norm.65 But
Congress also failed to take action. Not only had Congress failed to out-
63. J. POLLACK, supra note 10, at 209.
64. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
65. "Jim Crow" laws required segregation of blacks in virtually all public facilities. The
laws were upheld in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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law segregation in the states, it had affirmatively provided for segregation
in Washington, D.C. Chief Justice Vinson emphasized this point in his
presentation to the Justices while presiding at the first conference held on
the Brown case. Vinson stressed that segregation had never been ques-
tioned by Congress. "However [we] construe it," he said, "Congress did
not pass a statute deterring and ordering no segregation."66 On the con-
trary, Congress itself had commanded segregation in the nation's capitol.
"I don't see," Vinson affirmed, "how we can get away from the long-
established acceptance in the District [of Columbia]. For 90 years, there
have been segregated schools in this city."67 Vinson did admit that "it
would be better if [Congress] would act."6 But Congress had not done
so and there was no indication that it would in the foreseeable future.
No formal vote was taken in Brown during Chief Justice Vinson's
tenure, but it appears that Vinson would have voted to uphold the consti-
tutionality of school segregation.69 Not surprisingly, he found support
for his position in the congressional failure to outlaw the practice.
Chief Justice Warren approached the Brown issue from an entirely
different point of view. Unlike his predecessor, Warren began his first
Brown conference with a ringing declaration that segregation was uncon-
stitutional. He stated the issue in moral terms: "[T]he more I've read
and heard and thought, the more I've come to conclude that the basis of
segregation and 'separate but equal' rests upon a concept of the inherent
inferiority of the colored race."70
To one who felt this way, the claim of congressional acquiescence
through inaction could scarcely justify the imprimatur of legality upon a
patently immoral and unconstitutional practice. On the contrary, the
years of legislative inaction coupled with the unlikelihood that Congress
would attempt to correct the situation in the foreseeable future made it
imperative for the Court to intervene. The alternative would leave un-
touched a practice that flagrantly violated both the Constitution and the
ultimate human values involved. The Chief Justice found such an alter-
native unpalatable. Since the other branches had defaulted in their re-
sponsibility, the courts had to ensure enforcement of the constitutional
prohibition against racial discrimination.
66. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, at 74.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Letter from Felix Frankfurter to Stanley Reed (May 20, 1954) (The Felix Frankfurter
Papers, available at Harvard Law School).
70. B. SCHWARTZ, supra note 6, at 86. See also supra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
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B. Baker v. Carr
Next to Brown v. Board of Education, the most significant case de-
cided by the Warren Court was Baker v. Carr.71 According to the Chief
Justice, Baker v. Carr "was the most important case of my tenure on the
Court."72 The Court's decision in the case led to a drastic shift in polit-
ical power throughout the nation. Through Baker v. Carr and its prog-
eny,73 the Warren Court ultimately worked an electoral reform
comparable to that achieved by the British Parliament when it incorpo-
rated the program of the English Reform Movement into the statute
book.
Even more than Brown, Baker v. Carr may be explained as a judicial
response to the default of the political branches. The 1901 Tennessee
statute at issue in the case, which apportioned seats in the state legisla-
ture, apparently was a fair law when enacted. As time went on, however,
population shifts increasingly altered the picture. By the time Baker
brought his lawsuit, the 1901 law no longer reflected the state's popula-
tion distribution. Baker's complaint claimed that voters from urban ar-
eas had been denied equal protection "by virtue of the debasement of
their votes," since a vote from the most populous county had only a frac-
tion of the weight of one from the least populous county. The population
ratio for the most and least populous districts by then was over nineteen
to one.
To correct this situation by a nonjudicial remedy, the very legisla-
ture whose existence depended upon the malapportionment under the
1901 statute would have had to pass a new reapportionment law. That
event would have been tantamount to the rural legislators who profited
from the situation voting many of their seats out of existence. It would
have been quixotic to expect them to do so. Political paralysis resulted
with an inevitable increase in the gross disparities as time brought further
demographic changes.
To remedy this problem, the Supreme Court finally had "to enter
this political thicket."'7 4 No other feasible way existed to correct the pat-
ent violation of the constitutional command of voting equality. This lack
of any other remedy strongly influenced at least one member of the
Baker v. Carr majority, Justice Clark. He had originally voted not to
hear Baker's suit and had agreed to join the Frankfurter dissent in the
case. Justice Frankfurter had tried to firm up Clark's vote by suggesting
71. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
72. E. WARREN, THE MEMOIRS OF EARL WARREN 306 (1977).
73. See, eg., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
74. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
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that he write separately to describe the other remedies open to Tennes-
see's voters.75 Clark soon found that no other remedies existed. His dis-
covery led him to write to Frankfurter:
Preparatory to writing my dissent in this case, along the line you
suggested of pointing out the avenues that were open for the voters
of Tennessee to bring about reapportionment despite its Assembly,
I have carefully checked into the record. I am sorry to say that I
cannot find any practical course that the people could take in
bringing this about except through the Federal courts.7 6
Clark, therefore, decided to switch his vote and join the Baker v. Carr
majority.
While considering the matter, Justice Clark jotted down a note:
"Here a minority by representatives ignores the needs and desires of the
majority-and for their own selfish purpose hamper and opress them-
debar them from equal privileges and equal rights-that means the fail-
ure of our constitutional system."' 77 The Justice had decided that only a
judicial remedy could redress that failure.
There is little doubt that the Chief Justice had come to the same
conclusion. Warren's statement on the basis of his Court's reapportion-
ment decisions bears requoting: "Most of the problems could have been
solved through the political processes rather than through the courts.
But as it was, the Court had to decide.",78 The decision in Baker v. Carr
came down because "the political process" had failed to remedy the con-
stitutional violation that deprived Baker of an equal vote.
C. Mapp v. Ohio
The government's failure to remedy another constitutional violation
formed the foundation for the opinion in Mapp v. Ohio,79 a decision that
Justice Fortas characterized as "the most radical decision in recent
times."C The Mapp decision held that the exclusionary rule, which bars
evidence obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment's ban against
unreasonable searches and seizures, applies in state as well as federal
cases.
75. Letter from Tom C. Clark to Felix Frankfurter (Feb. 3, 1962) (The Felix Frankfurter
Papers, available at Harvard Law School).
76. Letter from Tom C. Clark to Felix Frankfurter (Mar. 7, 1962) (The Felix Frankfurter
Papers, available at Harvard Law School).
77. Note of Tom C. Clark (The Clark Papers, available at Tarlton Law Library, Univer-
sity of Texas).
78. J. POLLACK, supra note 10, at 209.
79. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
80. Interview with Justice Fortas (Sept. 1979).
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The Mapp majority was strongly influenced by Ohio's failure to take
action against Fourth Amendment violations by state police officers.
Wolfv. Colorado,81 the leading case prior to Mapp, noted that the Fourth
Amendment was "basic to a free society. It is therefore implicit in 'the
concept of ordered liberty' and as such enforceable against the States
through the Due Process Clause."8 Nevertheless, Wolf refused to hold
that the federal Constitution required application of the exclusionary
rule in state criminal cases.83 The result was, in the words of the Wolf
opinion, "that in a prosecution in a State court for a State crime the
Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the admission of evidence ob-
tained by an unreasonable search and seizure."81 4
Wolf refused to extend the exclusionary rule to state cases because
that rule was not, "in the face of prospectively available alternative reme-
dies such as private damage suits, the pressure of an informed public
opinion and internal police disciplinary measures, so clearly the only
safeguard against invasion of privacy by local officers."8" In Mapp, how-
ever, the Court found "the claimed alternative safeguards . . . unsatis-
factory in their deterrence of police invasions of privacy."86
Though the Mapp opinion made this point, it was spelled out more
fully in the draft opinion that Justice Clark circulated two months before
he delivered the opinion of the Court. Like the final opinion, Clark de-
clared in his draft that "other means of protection" to safeguard the
Fourth Amendment right, other than the exclusionary rule itself, were
"worthless and futile."87 The draft, however, more specifically addressed
what it termed the "obvious futility of any longer seeking to relegate the
Fourth Amendment to the protection of other remedies." 8
Concerning "private damage remedies," Justice Clark's draft asked,
"how can we expect to defend 'the indefeasible right of personal security'
by telling him who suffers its invasion to seek damages for 'the breaking
of doors?' "89 In addition, he asserted that "[a]n aroused public opinion
and internal police discipline are equally without the deterrent value." 90
According to Clark's draft,
81. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
82. Id. at 27-28.
83. Ia. at 33.
84. Id.
85. Clark, Draft opinion in Mapp v. Ohio, at 5 (The Tom C. Clark Papers, available in the
Tarlton Law Library, University of Texas).
86. Id. at 6.
87. 367 U.S. at 651-52.
88. Clark, supra note 85, at 11.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 12.
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it appears hopelessly impractical to consider formulation of an ef-
fective body of public opinion as a remedy practicably available to
those who suffer unconstitutional invasions of their privacy. They
are in large measure criminal defendants, and more unlikely or-
ganizers of an effective and respectable public opinion would be
difficult to find.9
The default of other remedies led directlty to the Mapp decision. As
Clark noted in his draft, "The question is whether there presently exists
available to citizens of the non-exclusionary states any remedy which can
be said to meet 'the minimal standards of Due Process.' One fails of
discovery, and we are bound to require adherence to the constitutionally
mandated rule of Weeks" 92-i.e., the exclusionary rule.
Once again, the Warren Court made a far-reaching decision because
it concluded that there was no other way to effectuate a constitutional
right. The remedies suggested by the Wolf Court had proved to be futile,
and the Court could not depend on the political branches to implement
the Fourth Amendment safeguard. On the contrary, government failure
to take any enforcement action led to the Mapp situation. If the Court
did not act, the constitutional safeguard would remain nugatory.
Though Chief Justice Warren did not play a leading role in the
Mapp decision, he concurred in the approach just stated. One case re-
ferred to in Mapp was Irvine v. California,93 in which Warren joined a
majority decision affirming a conviction based on evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Although Warren followed the
Wolf approach in Irvine, he joined Justice Jackson in going out of the
way to state that, if the police in Irvine had willfully violated the Fourth
Amendment, their conduct constituted a federal crime. Warren and
Jackson directed the clerk of the Court "to forward a copy of the record
in this case, together with a copy of this opinion, for attention of the
Attorney General of the United States."94
Warren later informed his law clerks that nothing ever came of for-
warding the record and opinion to the Attorney General.95 The failure
of the Department of Justice to investigate the situation showed Warren
that the judicial abnegation in Irvine had been misguided. If constitu-
tional rights would remain unenforced in practice, the Chief Justice had
to consider a more activist judicial role. As Warren put it in an interview
just after he retired, either the Court would act to enforce the constitu-
91. Id.
92. Id. at 13 (referring to Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914)).
93. 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
94. Id. at 138.
95. See supra note 62.
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tional guarantees involved in these cases, "or we let them go and sweep
them under the rug, only to leave them for future generations. 96
D. Miranda v. Arizona
Next to Mapp v. Ohio, the Warren Court rendered its most impor-
tant criminal law decision in Miranda v. Arizona.97 It was also the most
controversial. Miranda gave rise to complaints from law enforcement
officers throughout the country, who denounced the Court for putting
"another set of handcuffs on the police department. ' 98
"The Miranda decision," the Court recently revealed, "was based in
large part on this Court's view that the warnings which it required police
to give to suspects in custody would reduce the likelihood that the sus-
pects would fall victim to constitutionally impermissible practices of po-
lice interrogation in the presumptively coercive environment of the
station house." 99 From this viewpoint, Miranda was a direct conse-
quence of Chief Justice Warren's own experience as a district attorney.
Justice Fortas, a member of the Miranda Court, said that the decision
"was entirely [Warren's]."" 0 The Chief Justice's conference presenta-
tion led the way to the majority decision"' he himself delivered.
In Miranda, as in the other cases discussed, Warren was influenced
most by the fact that the required warnings were the only effective way to
protect Fifth Amendment rights during police interrogation. The Mi-
randa majority was as aware as the dissenters in the case that the Court's
requirement "would have the effect of decreasing the number of suspects
who respond to police questioning." 0" But the need to prevent unconsti-
tutional police practices outweighed that factor. "The Miranda majority
• . . apparently felt that whatever the cost to society in terms of fewer
convictions of guilty suspects, that cost would simply have to be borne in
the interest of enlarged protection for the Fifth Amendment
privilege."10 3
Warren's own experience as a former district attorney played a cru-
cial role in his thinking. Methods of arrest, questioning of suspects, and
police conduct in the station house were matters that the Chief Justice
intimately understood from his years as prosecutor in Alameda County,
96. The Law: The Legacy of the Warren Court, TIME, July 4, 1969, at 63.
97. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
98. J. WEAVER, supra note 32, at 234 (quoting Los Angeles Mayor Sam Yorty).
99. New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. 2626, 2632 (1984).
100. Interview with Justice Fortas, supra note 80.
101. See B. ScHwARTz, supra note 6, at 589.
102. New York v. Quarles, 104 S. Ct. at 2632.
103. Id.
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California. Above all, he recognized the problem of police abuses and
the lack of effective methods to deal with them. All that had been said in
Mapp about the lack of remedies against Fourth Amendment violations
applied with even greater force to practices in police interrogation rooms.
Here, as with the other cases previously discussed, there was little likeli-
hood of effective action by the other branches of government to rectify
the problem. Political default again made judicial action imperative.
Once more, if the Court did not step in, there was no way to "reduce the
likelihood that suspects would fall victim to constitutionally impermissi-
ble practices of police interrogation.""
Conclusion
How then can Earl Warren's work as a judge be summarized?
Chief Justice Warren will never rank with the consummate legal
craftsmen who have fashioned the structure of Anglo-American law over
the generations-each professing to be a pupil, yet each a builder who
added his few bricks. 105 But Warren was never content to deem himself
a mere vicar of the common law tradition. Instead he was the paradigm
of the "result-oriented" judge, who used his power to secure the result he
deemed right in the cases that came before his Court. Employing the
authority of the ermine to the utmost, he never hesitated to do whatever
he thought necessary to translate his own conceptions of fairness and
justice into the law of the land.
In reaching what he considered the just result, the Chief Justice was
not deterred by the demands of stare decisis. For Warren, principle was
more compelling than precedent. The key decisions of the Warren Court
overruled decisions of earlier Courts.106 Those precedents had left the
enforcement of constitutional rights to the political branches. Yet, the
latter had failed to act. In Warren's view, this situation left the Court
with the choice either to follow the precedent or to vindicate the right.
For the Chief Justice, there was never any question as to which was the
correct alternative.
Warren cannot be deemed a great juristic technician, noted for his
mastery of the common law. But he never pretended to be a legal scholar
104. Id.
105. Cf. Hand, Mr. Justice Cardozo, 52 HARV. L. REv. 361 (1939).
106. See, eg., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (overruling Betts v. Brady, 316
U.S. 455 (1942)); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962) (discussed supra at text accompanying
notes 71-78); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (discussed supra at text accompanying notes
79-96); and Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (discussed supra at text accom-
panying notes 64-70).
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or to profess interest in legal philosophy or reasoning. To him, the out-
come of a case mattered more than the reasoning behind the decision.
He took full responsibility for the former and delegated the latter, in
large part, to his law clerks.
The result may have been a deficiency in judicial craftsmanship that
subjected Warren to constant academic criticism, both during and after
his tenure on the bench. Without a doubt, Warren does not rank with
Holmes or Cardozo as a master of the opinion, but his opinions have a
mark of their own. Warren would go over the drafts prepared by his
clerks and make changes, usually adding or substituting straightforward
language typical of his manner of presentation. "He had a penchant for
Anglo-Saxon words over Latin words and he didn't like foreign phrases
thrown in if there was a good American word that would do." 107
As a consequence, the important Warren opinions have a simple
power of their own; if they do not resound with the cathedral tones of a
Marshall, I"8 they speak with the moral decency of a modem Micah. Per-
haps the Brown opinion did not articulate the juristic bases of its decision
in as erudite a manner as it could have, but as the Chief Justice wrote in
his memorandum transmitting the Brown draft, the opinion was "pre-
pared on the theory that [it] should be short, readable by the lay public,
non-rhetorical, unemotional and, above all, non-accusatory."109 The de-
cision in Brown emerged from a typical Warren moral judgment, with
which few today would disagree. The Warren opinion was so right in
that judgment that one wonders whether additional learned labor in
spelling out the obvious was really necessary.
When all is said and done, Warren's place in the judicial pantheon
rests, not upon his opinions, but upon his decisions. If impact on the law
is the hallmark of the outstanding judge, few occupants of the bench
have been more outstanding than Chief Justice Warren. In terms of in-
fluence, he must be placed only second to Marshall in the rank of
Supreme Court Justices. The decisions made by his Court, mostly under
his direct lead, accomplished what a member of the Court termed "the
most profound and pervasive revolution ever achieved by substantially
peaceful means.' 110 That statement summarizes the importance of the
Chief Justice and his Court.
107. Interview with Robert J. Hoerner, former clerk of Chief Justice Warren (Mar. 1979).
108. Cf. B. CARDOZO, Law and Literature, in SELECTED WRITINGS OF BENJAMIN NA-
THAN CARDOZO 342 (M. Hall ed. 1947).
109. Memorandum from Earl Warren to Members of the Supreme Court (May 7, 1954)
(The Clark Papers, available at Tarlton Law Library, University of Texas).
110. B. SCHWARTZ, THE AMENDMENT IN OPERATION: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, CENTENNIAL VOLUME, at 34 (quoting Justice Fortas).
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Justice Fortas once said that in his conference presentations, Chief
Justice Warren normally went straight to the ultimate moral values in-
volved-just as he did in his first Brown conference. Faced with that
approach, traditional legal arguments seemed out of place. As Fortas
put it, "opposition based on the hemstitching and embroidery of the law
appeared petty in terms of Warren's basic value approach."
1
"
'
The same appears to be true when we consider Earl Warren's judi-
cial performance. To criticize him for his lack of scholarship or judicial
craftsmanship seems petty when we weigh these deficiencies against the
contributions he made as leader in the greatest judicial transformation of
the law since the days of John Marshall.
111. Interview with Justice Fortas, supra note 80.
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